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Abstract  Severance  pay,  a  ﬁxed-sum  payment  to  workers  at  job  separation,  has  been  the  focus
of intense  policy  concern  for  the  last  several  decades,  but  much  of  this  concern  is  unearned.
The design  of  the  ideal  separation  package  is  outlined  and  severance  pay  emerges  as  a  natural
component  of  job  displacement  insurance  packages,  serving  both  as  scheduled  reemployment
wage insurance  and,  if  search  moral  hazard  is  a  problem,  as  scheduled  UI.  Like  any  ﬁrm-ﬁnanced
separation  expenditure,  severance  pay  can  induce  excessive  job  retention,  but  such  distortions
do not  appear  to  be  of  practical  signiﬁcance  at  beneﬁt  levels  typically  mandated  in  the  indus-
trialized world.  Moreover  there  is  no  evidence  that  ﬁrms  attempt  to  avoid  these  ﬁring  cost
distortions  by  substituting  severance  savings  plans,  which  have  zero  ﬁring  costs.  Indeed  sever-
ance insurance  plans  similar  to  those  mandated  are  often  offered  voluntarily  in  the  U.S.  The
appropriate  role  of  government  in  the  market  for  severance  pay  is  brieﬂy  considered.
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Comprensión  de  la  indemnización  por  despido
Resumen  La  indemnización  por  despido,  el  pago  de  una  suma  ﬁja  a  trabajadores  cuando
pierden su  trabajo,  ha  sido  el  foco  de  una  intensa  preocupación  política  en  las  últimas  décadas,
aunque gran  parte  de  esta  preocupación  no  está  justiﬁcada.  Se  describe  el  disen˜o  del  paquete
ideal de  despido  y  la  indemnización  por  despido  aparece  como  un  componente  natural  de  los
paquetes  de  seguros  por  pérdida  de  empleo,  sirviendo  tanto  como  seguro  salarial  programado
de reintegración  al  trabajo  como,  en  caso  de  que  el  riesgo  moral  de  búsqueda  sea  un  problema,despido;
Pérdida  de  empleo;
costes  del  despido;
seguro  de  desempleo;
riesgo  moral
seguro de  desempleo  programado.  Como  cualquier  pago  por  despido  ﬁnanciado  por  la  empresa,
la indemnización  por  despido  puede  dar  lugar  a  una  conservación  del  trabajo  excesiva,  aunque
estas deformaciones  no  parecen  tener  una  signiﬁcación  práctica  en  los  niveles  de  beneﬁcios
típicamente  exigidos  en  el  mundo  industrializado.  Además,  no  hay  pruebas  de  que  las  empresas
traten de  eludir  estas  deformaciones  de  los  costes  por  despido  sustituyendo  planes  de  ahorro  de
indemnizaciones,  que  no  conllevan  ningún  coste  por  despido.  De  hecho,  a  menudo  en  los  Estados
 This review relies heavily on my own work on severance pay over the past decade. A sabbatical year (2008--2009) in the middle of this
project was invaluable.
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Unidos  se  ofrecen  de  manera  voluntaria  planes  de  seguros  por  despido  similares  a  los  exigidos.
Se plantea  brevemente  la  función  adecuada  del  Gobierno  en  el  mercado  para  la  indemnización
por despido.
©  2013  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos  los  dere-
chos reservados.
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b. Introduction
he  last  twenty  years  have  witnessed  intense  concerns
bout  severance  pay  distortions,  often  labeled  ‘‘ﬁring  cost’’
istortions.1 Among  the  inﬂuential  early  calls  of  concern
as  Blanchard  et  al.  (1986).  Concern  turned  to  alarm  when
azear  (1990)  published  a  piece  that  appeared  to  conﬁrm
he  pervasive,  negative  effect  of  severance  pay  on  the  per-
ormance  of  national  labor  markets.2
Policy  skepticism  of  severance  pay  may  simply  reﬂect  an
nfortunate  coincidence  of  high  unemployment  and  widely
andated  severance  pay  in  Western  Europe  that  prevailed
n  the  1980s.3 A  more  careful  reading  of  Lazear  (1990)
nd  exhaustive  follow-up  studies  by  Addison  et  al.  (2000)
nd  Addison  and  Teixeira  (2003),  among  others,  allayed  the
orst  fears  about  this  distortion.  In  retrospect  the  idea
hat  such  a  modest  fringe  beneﬁt  could  drive  national  labor
arkets  seems  a  bit  fanciful.  The  subsequent  literature
urned  to  a  broader  policy  villain----Employment  Protec-
ion  Legislation  (EPL),  Emerson  (1988)  and  OECD  (1999,
004,  2006)----and  yet  more  extensive  economic  regulations.
nfortunately  the  early,  if  perhaps  misdirected,  focus  on
everance  pay  distortions  has  diverted  attention  from  the
deal  design  of  severance  pay  plans  and  their  beneﬁts.
The  net  beneﬁts  of  severance  plans  may  be  substan-
ial,  as  revealed  by  the  existence  of  private  severance
ay  plans  in  the  United  States,  which  has  no  national
everance  mandate,  Parsons  (2005a,b,c).  Voluntary  plans
ave  the  same  ‘‘ﬁring  cost’’  implications  as  do  mandated
nes----the  key  is  the  ﬁrm’s  self-ﬁnance  of  the  separation
ost----but  the  distortions  do  not  discourage  voluntary  pro-
ision.  Although  these  voluntary  beneﬁt  schemes  are  not
verly  generous----one  week  or  two  weeks  of  pay  per  year  of
ervice  is  common,  Parsons  (2005c)----many  mandated  plans
orldwide  have  just  this  algorithm,  Holzmann  et  al.  (2012).
Severance  pay  has  much  to  recommend  it,  and  in  this
ssay  I  consider  the  beneﬁts  as  well  as  the  costs  of  sever-
nce  pay  in  light  of  research  since  the  1980s.  In  the  process
f  assessing  the  social  value  of  severance  pay,  the  role  of  sev-
rance  pay  in  the  ideal  job  displacement  insurance  package
s  outlined.  The  optimal  design  of  such  programs  will  dif-
er  signiﬁcantly  across  economies,  industrial  sectors,  and
orker  job  skills.  The  question  of  the  proper  role  of  the
tate  in  the  provision  of  severance  pay  is  also  considered.
1 The ﬁring cost label appears to be used interchangeably between
he costs that induce the distortions and the distortions themselves.
2 See for example the reviews and compendiums in Buechtemann
1992), Heckman and Pagés (2004), and Holzmann et al. (2012), and
he review in Parsons (2012a).
3 This analysis focuses on severance plans offered to broad classes
f workers, not the golden parachutes offered high level manage-
ent, which follow a more situation-speciﬁc logic.
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(The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  a  few
ey  deﬁnitions  are  introduced.  The  role  of  severance  pay  in
ob  displacement  insurance  is  then  outlined  in  Section  3.  Job
isplacement  insurance  is  a  vector  of  beneﬁts  designed  to
mooth  consumption  following  permanent  layoff,  especially
rom  a  long-held  job.4 In  the  ﬁrst-best  job  displacement
nsurance  plan,  unemployment  beneﬁts  compensate  laid-
ff  workers  for  the  lost  earnings  during  job  search,  while
age  insurance  compensates  them  for  reemployment  earn-
ngs  losses.5 Severance  serves  as  scheduled  wage  insurance
f  the  administrative  costs  of  actual  loss  wage  insurance
re  high.  If  (search)  moral  hazard  limits  unemployment
nsurance  beneﬁts,  then  severance  may  serve  as  scheduled
nemployment  insurance  as  well.6
Fixed-sum  payouts,  unaffected  by  actual  loss  experi-
nces,  give  the  insured  no  reason  to  incur  unnecessary  lost
orktime----indeed  that  is  just  the  reason  that  severance
eneﬁts  may  be  substituted  for  unemployment  insurance
eneﬁts.  But  any  expenditure  has  its  relevant  margin,  which
n  this  case  is  the  layoff  decision  itself.  Firm-ﬁnanced  sever-
nce  pay  may  encourage  employers  to  retain  in  low  demand
tates  workers  who  they  might  otherwise  layoff----the  ﬁring
ost  effect,  Section  4.  As  it  happens,  if  ﬁring  cost  distort-
ons  are  large,  the  ﬁrm  can  ‘‘contract  around’’  the  mandate,
azear  (1990).  Lazear  illustrates  this  avoidance  process,
sing  a  single  period  model  with  an  upfront  bond  paid  by  the
orker,  but  a  more  familiar  mechanism  would  be  a  savings
ccount,  in  this  case  a  severance  savings  account  payable
t  separation,  Section  5. The  absence  of  this  sort  of  substi-
ution  provides  indirect  evidence  of  the  limited  importance
f  ﬁring  cost  concerns.
The  paper  turns  in  Section  6  to  consideration  of  the
irect  empirical  evidence  on  ‘‘ﬁring  cost’’  effects  on  aggre-
ate  employment,  unemployment,  and  related  labor  market
henomenon.  Brieﬂy  summarizing  the  section----there  is  no
erious  evidence  that  severance  pay  per  se  negatively
ffects  aggregate  labor  market  functioning,  Parsons  (2012a).
nother  piece  of  evidence  for  the  same  conclusion,  the
xistence  of  voluntary  severance  insurance  plans  in  the  U.S.,
s  discussed  in  Section  7. With  voluntary  severance  plans  as
ackground,  potentially  useful  governmental  interventions
re  considered  in  Section  8.  Parallels  are  drawn  with  govern-
ent  interventions  in  support  of  ﬁrm-provided  pension  plans
n  the  U.S.  The  question  of  whether  severance  plans  should
4 Consumption smoothing across temporary layoffs, still relatively
ommon in the United States, is not considered.
5 Wage insurance is the less familiar of these. For an early policy
iscussion, see Baily et al. (1993); for later policy discussions, see
arsons (2000), Kletzer and Rosen (2006), Kling (2006), and LaLonde
2007).
6 See Baily (1977) for an early statement of this idea.
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be  mandated  is  also  considered,  given  the  pervasiveness  of
the  practice  internationally.
Section  9  digresses  from  the  central  theme  of  this  review
to  raise  one  cautionary  note----severance  pay  has  an  alter-
native  use,  as  a  tool  in  the  struggle  for  workplace  control
between  the  ﬁrm  and  worker  which  might  have  substan-
tial  productivity  effects.  Shop-ﬂoor  discipline  (as  it  might  be
labeled  in  an  earlier,  industrial  setting)  is  crucial  to  efﬁcient
management,  and  can  be  eroded  with  appropriate  sever-
ance  pay  design.  A  severance  package  designed  to  encourage
worker  retention  is  likely  to  look  quite  different  from  one
designed  for  insurance  purposes,  and  is  likely  to  be  accom-
panied  by  direct  retention  impediments.  Section  10  draws  a
few  conclusions  from  this  review.
2. Some deﬁnitions
Job  turnover  distinctions  are  important  in  the  job  displace-
ment  insurance  plans.  Consider  the  following  partition  of
job  separations,
(i) Quits  (employee-initiated  job  separation);
(ii)  Layoffs  (employer-initiated  job  separations  without
cause);
iii)  Discharges  (employer-initiated  job  separations  with
cause),  and
(iv)  Other, including  most  prominently  retirement.
Employee-initiated  and  employer-initiated  separations
are  often  referred  to  as  voluntary  and  involuntary  respec-
tively  (from  the  perspective  of  the  worker).  Each  of  these
separations  may  be  treated  differently  in  unemployment
insurance  programs  and  severance  plans.  The  distinction
between  temporary  and  permanent  layoffs  is  also  important.
Job  displacement  of  course  refers  to  permanent  employer-
initiated  job  separations.  Temporary  layoffs,  common  in  the
United  States,  are  employer-initiated  job  separations  that
are  expected  to  result  in  rehire,  often  after  a  known  time
period.  Permanent  layoffs  carry  no  such  expectations.7
Possible  programs  to  smooth  consumption  at  job  sepa-
ration  come  in  a  variety  of  forms.  Consider  the  following
program  types:
Unemployment  insurance.  Separation  payments  linked  to
the  worker’s  post-separation  unemployment  experience.
These  are  typically  periodic  payments  more  or  less  coin-
cident  with  the  unfolding  unemployment.
Wage  insurance.  Separation  payments  linked  to  the
worker’s  reemployment  wage  losses.  If  hours  are  stable,
this  is  a  form  of  wage  rate  insurance.
Severance  insurance.  Fixed-sum  separation  payments  (in
excess  of  accrued  wages,  vacations,  and  accrued  leave)
that  do  not  depend  on  the  worker’s  actual  post-separation
experience.  These  may  be  lump-sum  or  periodic  payments.
7 Because the future is unknown, permanently laid off workers are
sometimes rehired, and voluntary severance plans typically provide
for that contingency.
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Savings  accounts.8 These  involve  contributions  to  an
explicit  worker  asset  account  that  can  be  disbursed  to
the  worker  under  a  variety  of  conditions.  Common  payout
restrictions  deﬁne  the  following  four  types  of  funds:
Severance.  Involuntary  job  separation  or  retirement  are
permissible  disbursement  contingencies.
Unemployment.  Involuntary  job  separation  and  unem-
ployment  are  common  permissible  disbursement  contin-
gencies.  Disbursement  may  be  periodic,  more  or  less
coincident  with  the  unfolding  unemployment.
Retirement  (pensions).  Retirement  is  the  permissible  dis-
bursement  contingency.
Comprehensive  (provident  funds). Admit  a  broad  range
of  permissible  disbursement  contingencies----job  separa-
tion/unemployment,  disability,  retirement,  and  possibly
house  purchase  or  educational  ﬁnance.  Separation  from
the  ﬁrm  is  not  required.
The  lines  between  these  deﬁnitions  are  often  blurred,
nd  considerable  care  must  be  taken  in  assessing  the
ndividual  characteristics  of  each  plan.  For  example,  unem-
loyment  insurance  programs  are  equivalent  to  severance
ay  plans  with  periodic  payments  if  most  laid  off  work-
rs  ‘‘exhaust’’  their  beneﬁts.  Tracking  a  separated  worker’s
nemployment  experience  is  difﬁcult  in  highly  devel-
ped  economies  with  small  informal  sectors,  and  is  often
nfeasible  in  economies  with  a  large  informal  sectors  and  a
ubstantial  small-farm  agricultural  sector.  In  this  case,  sev-
rance  pay  will  be  the  primary  job  displacement  insurance
lement.
The  distinction  between  severance  savings  accounts,
hich  target  job  separation  and/or retirement  pensions,
nd  pensions,  which  theoretically  target  only  retirement
eeds,  is  also  likely  to  blur  in  practice.  In  the  United  States,
or  example,  workers  can  put  resources  into  a tax-deferred
etirement  savings  account,  most  prominently  401(k)  plans.
f  the  worker  separates  from  the  employer,  she  may  choose
o  roll-over  the  account  into  an  alternative  plan  or  she  can
ithdraw  the  funds  for  current  use.9 The  worker  faces  sub-
tantial  economic  penalties  if  she  withdraws  the  funds----the
unds  are  taxed  as  regular  income  and  the  worker  is  assessed
 10%  penalty.  The  introduction  of  economic  penalties  for
ithdrawal  generates  a  continuum  of  possible  combinations
f  severance  savings  accounts  and  pensions,  with  zero  sanc-
ions  creating  a  ‘‘pure’’  severance  savings  account,  and
rohibitive  sanctions  a  pure  pension.
Similarly  the  distinction  between  severance  insurance
lans  and  severance  savings  plans  depends  critically  on  the
uestion  of  whether  the  separated  worker  retains  rights  to
he  account  at  retirement  or  voluntary  departure  (quits),
arsons  (2012b).  Practically  the  distinction  varies  in  impor-
ance  with  the  nature  of  turnover.  If  involuntary  turnover  is
igh,  for  example,  and  the  worker  is  unlikely  to  remain  with
he  ﬁrm  into  retirement,  then  the  two  plans  are  essentially
quivalent----severance  insurance  plans.
8 These savings accounts may  be notional or fully funded, perhaps
ven held by the government or ﬁnancial institutions.
9 For a readable summary of 401(k) plans, see http://invest-faq.
om/articles/ret-plan-401k.html.
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. Severance pay and job displacement
nsurance: the fundamentals
orkers  face  many  threats  to  their  earnings.  One  serious
oncern,  perhaps  second  only  to  the  early  onset  of  a  serious
isability,  is  the  loss  of  a  long  time  job  (job  displacement).
 large  literature  establishes  that  displaced  senior  workers
ften  experience  long  unemployment  spells  and  lower  wages
pon  reemployment.10 Complete  insurance  would  require
ither  guaranteed  employment  or  a  layoff  contract  with
(i)  unemployment  insurance  and
ii)  wage  insurance
Layoff  contracts  will  be  preferred  if  negative  demand
hocks  are  large  and  the  alternatives  to  current  employ-
ent  attractive,  Azariadis  (1975)  and  Parsons  (2012c).  The
alance  between  guaranteed  employment  and  layoff  is  also
ffected  by  the  inability  or  unwillingness  of  ﬁrms  (or  govern-
ents)  to  supply  appropriate  job  displacement  insurance.
In  a  market  in  which  unemployment  and  wage  insur-
nce  are  efﬁciently  provided,  ﬁxed-sum  severance  payments
re  unnecessary.  Severance  pay----a  payout  whose  value  is
xed  at  the  time  of  separation----arises  optimally  only  when
ne  or  both  of  the  two  primary  instruments  are  absent
r  limited.  If  (actual  loss)  wage  insurance  is  unavailable,
erhaps  because  of  high  administrative  costs,11 severance
eneﬁts  are  essentially  scheduled  wage  loss  beneﬁts  and
ay  in  the  right  circumstance  be  a  satisfactory  alternative.
ost  labor  economists  believe  that  unemployment  insurance
eneﬁts  based  on  actual  unemployment  spells  are  distor-
ionary,  inducing  search  moral  hazard,  although  there  is
uch  debate  over  the  magnitude  of  this  effect.  The  con-
ern  is  that  the  worker  may  prefer  to  remain  on  unemployed
eneﬁts  rather  than  seek  and/or  accept  reemployment  job
ffers.12 If  these  concerns  limit  unemployment  beneﬁts,
everance  pay  may  serve  as  scheduled  (if  partial)  unemploy-
ent  insurance,  with  the  ﬁxed  sum  element  reducing  search
istortions.  Severance  pay  then  serves  two  functions:
(i)  as  scheduled,  rather  than  actual-loss  based,  wage  insur-
ance,  and
ii)  as  a  scheduled  supplement  to  actual-loss  based  unem-
ployment  insurance  constrained  by  search  moral  hazard
concerns.
These  considerations  shape  severance  plans  in  obvious
ays.  For  example,  severance  beneﬁt  schedules,  whether
andatory  or  voluntary,  are  almost  always  increasing  in
eniority  Holzmann  et  al.  (2012)  and  Parsons  (2005c)  respec-
ively.  This  is  the  logical  consequence  of  the  scheduled  wage
10 See especially Jacobson et al. (1993) and Farber (2011). Earlier
eviews include Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998).
11 Separating losses due to wage reductions from work hours reduc-
ions is an obvious administrative problem.
12 Holmlund (1998), Karni (1999), and Fredriksson and Holmlund
2006) provide excellent reviews. Paradigm theoretical studies of
ptimal unemployment insurance include Azariadis (1975), Baily
1977), Mortensen (1977), Shavell and Weiss (1979), and Hopenhayn
nd Nicolini (1997).
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nsurance  dimension  of  severance  pay.  The  job  displacement
oss  literature  provides  ample  evidence  for  the  common
elief  that  earnings  losses  are  larger  for  workers  with  long
eniority.  Both  mandated  and  voluntary  plans  incorporate
hat  loss  proﬁle  in  simple  ways,  usually  a linear  algorithm
ith  a  beneﬁt  structure  that  offers  one  or  two  ‘‘weeks  of
ay’’  per  year  of  service.13
Scheduled  insurance  beneﬁts,  even  after  this  seniority
djustment,  are  likely  to  be  imperfect  in  their  targeting.
ome  displaced  workers  will  be  undercompensated,  others
vercompensated,  and  it  is  important  to  assess  the  size  of
his  inefﬁciency.  The  main  concern  expressed  in  the  ﬁring
ost  literature,  however,  is  quite  another.  If  the  ﬁrm  self-
nances  severance  beneﬁts,  then  layoff  moral  hazard  may
merge----ﬁrms  may  excessively  retain  redundant  workers  in
 downturn.  Inefﬁcient  retention  of  workers  in  downturns  in
urn  is  likely  to  smooth  employment  over  the  business  cycle.
his  inefﬁciency  and  the  implied  higher  labor  costs,may
ower  average  employment.14 This  issue  is  discussed  further
n  the  next  section.
. Firing cost concerns
n  extensive  literature  raises  concerns  about  the  potential
ayoff  distortions  induced  by  the  mandating  of  employer-
nanced  severance  plans  (ﬁring  costs).  That  said,  it  is
mportant  to  emphasize  that  ﬁring  cost  concerns  arise  from
nancing  considerations,  not  from  the  design  of  the  beneﬁts,
arsons  (2012d). In  that  sense,  the  link  between  sever-
nce  pay  and  ﬁring  costs  may  be  an  historical  accident.
ost  of  the  OECD  countries  that  were  the  focus  of  early
iscussions  mandated  that  the  ﬁrm  provide  the  separation
eneﬁt,  with  ﬁnancing  then  falling  entirely  on  the  ﬁrm.  The
ame  countries  operated  and  funded  unemployment  insur-
nce  quite  differently----plans  were  not  ‘‘experience  rated,’’
hich  is  to  say  ﬁrms  did  not  get  charged  for  the  beneﬁts
aid  out  to  their  own  separated  workers,  so  the  ﬁrm  has  no
rogram-related  incentive  to  avoid  layoffs.
Clearly  other  systems  are  possible,  and  indeed  the  U.S.
nemployment  insurance  system  has  embedded  within  it
ubstantial  experience  rating.  As  a  rule  of  thumb,  one  might
ssume  that  U.S.  ﬁrms  are  charged  for  50%  of  the  unem-
loyment  beneﬁts  distributed  to  their  own  laid  off  workers.
irms  are  responsible  for  100%  of  their  voluntary  severance
eneﬁts.  In  the  U.S.  then  expected  ﬁring  costs,  critical  for
he  retention  decision,  would  be  the  sum  of  severance  pay
nd  50%  of  expected  unemployment  beneﬁts.  The  typical
everance  beneﬁt  algorithm  has  beneﬁts  as  an  increasing,
ften  linearly  increasing,  function  of  seniority.  Combined
ith  the  common  practice  of  last-in  ﬁrst-out  layoff  queues,
his  policy  insures  that  severance-based  ﬁring  costs  for  the
arginal  worker  are  likely  to  be  small,  so  ﬁring  costs  in  the
.S.  are  dominated  by  unemployment-insurance.
13 See Section 7 below.
14 The effects on unemployment are yet more indirect, because
orkers who fail to ﬁnd reemployment may leave the labor force
ather than present themselves as unemployed. Nonetheless one
ight conjecture that unemployment will rise in such an environ-
ent.
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appear  to  have  little  impact  on  worker  separations  (or  acces-Understanding  severance  pay  
The  proximate  distortion  induced  by  ﬁring  costs  is
of  course  excessive  retention  of  workers  in  low  demand
periods.  Labor  hoarding  is  of  course  common  in  all  ﬁrms,
especially  those  in  product  markets  characterized  by  small
demand  shocks.  More  generally  worker  retention  in  a  down-
turn  is  likely  to  be  a  (negative)  function  of  the  probability
of  securing  an  attractive  job  if  laid  off  or,  failing  that,  the
worker’s  valuation  of  leisure  in  unemployment,  Azariadis
(1975)  and  Parsons  (2012d).  Firing  costs  disturb  this  balance,
and  induce  ﬁrms  to  keep  workers  inefﬁciently  in  more  severe
downturns.
The  inefﬁcient  retention  of  workers  in  low  demand  times
by  deﬁnition  reduces  ﬁrm  productivity.  The  economic  dis-
tortions  highlighted  in  the  early  ﬁring  cost  literature----high
unemployment  rates,  low  employment  rates,  etc.----are less
certain  implications  of  high  ﬁring  costs.  Its  impact  on
employment  depends  on  the  ﬂexibility  of  wages  and  the
nature  of  supply  responses  to  variations  in  wages,  while  its
impact  on  unemployment  is  yet  harder  to  predict  (because
it  is  model  speciﬁc).  Elegant  dynamic  models,  Bentolila  and
Bertola  (1990)  and  Bertola  (1990,  1992),  illustrate  that  it
is  at  least  possible  for  ﬁring  costs  to  have  negative  employ-
ment  effects.  In  his  comprehensive  review  of  this  literature,
however,  Bertola  (1999)  appears  to  encourage  the  reader  to
look  elsewhere,  especially  at  wage  policies,  to  explain  labor
market  dysfunctions.
Distributional  implications  are  more  direct.  Excessive
retention  of  workers  in  low  demand  times  will  moderate  job
turnover  across  the  business  cycle,  favoring  those  with  jobs
and  penalizing  those  without,  more  notably  new  entrants
(the  young).  The  old-young  distributional  concern  is  poten-
tially  accentuated  by  the  insurance  structure  of  severance
pay,  Pagés  and  Montenegro  (2007).  As  noted  earlier,  the
weeks-of-pay  per  year  of  service  algorithm  has  ﬁrms  pay-
ing  only  modest  beneﬁts  to  low  tenured  workers  (the  young)
and  much  more  to  high  tenured  workers.15 Clearly  there  are
two  views  on  the  social  value  of  this  reallocation.
5. Mandated severance pay and ﬁrm
avoidance strategies
An  oddity  of  the  early  ﬁring  cost  literature  is  that  one  of
the  papers  that  fueled  concern  about  ﬁring  cost  distortions
of  severance  mandates,  Lazear  (1990),  contained  a  simple
model  that  illustrated  the  ease  of  avoiding  them.  Lazear
demonstrated  that  severance  mandates  can  be  ‘‘contracted
around’’  by  having  the  ﬁrm  require  that  the  worker  post
a  bond  at  the  beginning  of  a  work  period,  which  is  then
returned  to  the  worker  at  the  end  of  the  period----either
as  a  result  of  an  involuntary  job  separation,  satisfying  the
severance  mandate,  or  not.  By  paying  the  beneﬁt  to  those
retained  as  well  as  those  laid  off,  any  artiﬁcial  advantage
from  retaining  a  worker  in  bad  times  is  eliminated.  Firing
costs  in  this  case  are  the  difference  between  the  payouts  to
those  laid  off  and  the  payouts  to  those  retained,  or  zero.
Explicit  bonding  in  the  labor  market  is  not  common,
which  may  explain  why  empirical  work  on  severance  pay
15 Union contracts and norms in larger non-union workplaces often
lead to the same layoff selection queue.
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istortions  continued,16 but  the  same  end  can  be  reached
y  more  familiar  means.  The  ﬁrm  need  only  convert  the
andated  severance  insurance  payout  into  a severance  sav-
ngs  plan  or  pension,  payable  at  departure  from  the  ﬁrm.
lthough  workers  in  this  case  would  get  beneﬁts  only  upon
ermanent  separation,  undistributed  beneﬁts  would  accrue
o  the  workers’  accounts.  The  ﬁrm  paying  out  severance  at
ayoff  incurs  a  cost,  but  this  is  offset  by  an  equal  and  oppo-
ite  reduction  in  its  future  liabilities  (expected  payouts),
arsons  (2012b). Indeed  the  ﬁrm  may  not  hold  the  savings
t  all,  but  assign  it  to  a third  party,  presumably  a  ﬁnancial
ntermediary.  In  this  case,  the  ﬁrm’s  only  involvement  with
he  job  separation  payout  is  to  certify  the  existence  of  the
vent.
There  is  little  evidence  of  such  avoidance  strategies,
hich  suggests  that  ﬁring  cost  distortions  are  modest,
hough  not  necessarily  zero.  Lazear  mentions  the  ﬁnancial
osts,  with  the  worker  having  difﬁculty  ﬁnancing  the  upfront
ond.  Presumably  ﬁrm-provided  savings  plans  are  funded
y  foregone  earnings,  but  the  earnings  offset  may  be  less
han  dollar  for  dollar  if  workers  are  liquidity  constrained  or
yopic.
Of  course,  avoidance  behaviors  are  appropriate  only  if
he  ﬁrm  does  not  value  the  beneﬁt.  As  we  shall  see  shortly,
ection  7, voluntary  severance  pay  is  common  in  the  United
tates  where  severance  beneﬁts  are  not  mandated.  Indeed
he  beneﬁt  algorithm  in  ﬁrms  where  beneﬁts  are  voluntarily
ffered  is  comparable  to  that  under  many  OECD  severance
andates,  which  suggests  that  the  ﬁrm  believes  it  is  prof-
table  for  it  to  offer  the  insurance,  so  avoidance  is  not  an
ssue.  That  does  not  mean  that  ﬁring  cost  distortions  do  not
xist----the  potential  distortion  arises  whenever  separation
eneﬁts  are  ﬁrm-ﬁnanced----but  that  the  effects  are  probably
ot  large.
U.S.  ﬁrms  that  offer  severance  pay  almost  universally
rovide  severance  insurance,  not  severance  savings  plans,
hich  again  suggests  that  ﬁring  cost  distortions  are  not
arge.  This  preference  is  perhaps  not  surprising  following
assage  of  the  Employee  Retirement  Income  Security  Act
ERISA)  of  1974,  which  placed  pensions  and  pension-like
lans  such  as  severance  savings  plans  under  rather  stringent
nd  costly  regulation.  The  policy  preference  for  sever-
nce  insurance  predates  ERISA  however  and  indeed  held
ven  in  the  early  years  of  formal  plans,  the  1930s,  Parsons
2005a,b).
.  Severance pay distortions: the empirical
ecord
 critical  review  of  the  extensive  empirical  literature
n  mandate  effects  supports  that  interpretation.  Sever-
nce  mandates,  unaccompanied  by  other  labor  regulations,ions)  or  average  employment  levels,  the  target  most  often
onsidered  in  the  ﬁring  cost  literature.  This  conclusion  is  not
16 See Blanchard (1998) to get a sense of the greater impact of the
azear insight in the theoretical literature. Separation ‘‘taxes,’’
hough empirically irrelevant, became a staple of theoretical ﬁring
ost models.
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ket.  They  are,  by  their  nature,  less  transparent  in  their22  
lways  apparent  in  individual  studies,  because  sufﬁciently
road  interventions  in  the  economy  do  have  substantial
egative  consequences.  The  challenge  is  to  disentangle
he  effects  of  these  more  substantial  policies  from  that
f  a  single  component,  severance  pay  generosity.  A  seri-
us  impediment  to  empirical  analysis  of  severance  mandate
ffects  is  that  changes  in  mandate  requirements  are  typ-
cally  embedded  in  broad  policy  ‘‘reforms,’’  making  the
dentiﬁcation  of  severance  policy  consequences  impossible.
mployment  Protection  Legislation  (EPL),  for  example,  is  a
ector  of  policy  instruments,  only  one  of  which  is  job  dis-
lacement  insurance.17
I  have  undertaken  a  detailed  review  of  the  ﬁring
ost  literature  elsewhere,  Parsons  (2012a).  As  I  note
here,  ‘‘Evidence  of  adverse  efﬁciency  effects  of  govern-
ent  interventions  is  most  compelling  when  the  range
f  interventions  is  large’’  (p.  149),  examples  of  this
bound.  Comprehensive  government  intervention  in  the
conomy----heavy  tariffs,  highly  regulated  product  and  fac-
or  markets,  including  capital  controls  and  capital  market
estrictions  as  well  as  those  in  the  labor  market----have
arge,  negative  effects  on  the  labor  market,  while  broad
conomic  ‘‘reforms’’  easing  these  restrictions  yield  large,
ositive  gains.  Similarly  broad  labor  regulations,  especially
ith  regard  to  collective  bargaining  and  dispute  resolu-
ion,  may  have  large  (negative)  consequences  on  labor  force
ggregates  and  the  economy.18
As  the  package  of  simultaneous  policy  changes  nar-
ows,  so  do  the  consequences.  Employment  Protection
egislation  (EPL)----a combination  of  severance  pay  man-
ates,  advance  notice  mandates,  and  limits  on  disciplinary
ischarges----appears  to  have  substantial,  negative  (and
eriﬁable)  effects  only  on  worker  separations  and  acces-
ions,  and  therefore  aggregate  turnover.  Reﬂecting  the
PL  effects  on  turnover,  evidence  of  EPL  distributional
onsequences  is  robust.  EPL  restrictions  make  permanent
ontracts  more  difﬁcult  for  new  workers  to  secure,  which
avors  ‘‘prime  age’’  men  at  the  expense,  most  consistently,
f  the  young  and  the  low  skilled,  and,  in  some  circum-
tances,  women  and  older  workers.
The  few  studies  that  credibly  isolate  variations  in  sev-
rance  pay  alone  provide  scant  reason  for  concern.  Even
arge  beneﬁt  mandates  appear  to  have  only  slight  ﬁring  cost
ffects,  although  large  beneﬁt  mandates  are  observed  only
n  developing  economies  where  enforcement  is  likely  to  be
eak.  See  below  Section  8.  The  lesson  for  job  displace-
ent  insurance  designers  is  that  indirect  mandate  effects
f  severance  pay  are  modest  over  the  range  observed  in
ndustrialized  economies. Within  some  reasonable  bounds,
eneﬁt  generosity  can  apparently  be  set  by  the  worker’s
emand  for  the  insurance  coverage  without  concern  for
oral  hazard  effects.  That  said,  a  variety  of  results  point
oward  workplace  control  issues,  including  the  employer’s
bility  to  release  unsatisfactory  workers,  and  collective  bar-
aining  rules,  as  an  important  concern.19
17 Severance pay generosity at nine months, four years, and twenty
ears cumulatively is only 8% of the OECD’s EPL index in 2004, OECD
2004, Table 2.11.1 pp. 103--105).
18 Again see the discussion in Parsons (2012a).
19 See below, Section 9.
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. Voluntary severance pay: a proﬁle
lthough  the  large  expected  losses  from  permanent  job  dis-
lacement  are  well-documented,  much  less  is  known  about
he  nature  of  severance  pay,  the  primary  insurance  plan
esigned  to  mitigate  those  losses.  Private  severance  pay  is
idespread  in  the  U.S.  economy,  a  logical  response  to  the
otentially  large  losses  that  senior,  permanently  displaced
orkers  suffer.20 In  2001,  one-quarter  (26%)  of  the  full-time
orkforce  was  covered  by  a  formal  severance  plan,  with
arge  differentials  by  occupation,  work  hours  status,  ﬁrm
ize,  and  industrial  sector.  Occupationally,  42%  of  full-time
rofessionals  and  administrators  were  covered,  but  only  29%
f  clerical  and  sales  workers,  and  16%  of  blue-collar  and
ervice  workers.  Establishment  size  is  also  a  powerful  factor,
ith  about  36%  of  all  full-time  workers  in  medium  and  large
stablishments  (one  hundred  or  more  employees)  covered,
ut  only  16%  of  small  establishments.21
By  sector,  total  severance  coverage  in  2001  was
s  high  in  the  goods-sector  as  in  the  service-sector,
lthough  that  is  misleading  because  the  goods-sector
mploys  a  disproportionate  share  of  low-coverage  blue-
ollar  workers,  and  relatively  fewer  clerical/sales  and
dministrative/professional  workers.  Within  occupations,
overage  was  substantially  higher  in  the  goods-sector  for
ll  but  blue  collar/service  workers,  and  was  especially
o  in  medium  and  large  establishments.  In  medium  and
arge  establishments,  almost  two-thirds  (65%)  of  full-time
dministrative/professional  workers  in  the  goods-producing
ector  were  covered, compared  to  less  than  one  half  (48%)
n  the  service-producing  sector.
Data  on  the  generosity  of  beneﬁts  when  offered  is  less
han  ideal.  Public  sources  provide  little  evidence  on  sever-
nce  plan  structure,  despite  the  fact  that  one-quarter  of  the
.S.  work  force  has  such  coverage.  The  BLS,  for  example,
as  never  systematically  collect  information  on  severance
lan  design, and  in  2006  stopped  collecting  information  on
he  presence  of  a  severance  plan  in  its  National  Compensa-
ion  Survey.  Major  collective  bargaining  agreements,  which
re  available  from  the  BLS,  provide  a  reliable  data  source,
ut  only  for  a  small  and  shrinking  share  of  the  labor  force,
nd  tabulations  of  contract  characteristics  from  the  raw  ﬁles
re  costly.
The  absence  of  reliable  government  data  on  the  struc-
ure  of  severance  plans  has  induced  a variety  of  private
fforts,  including  ambitious  surveys  by  the  National  Indus-
rial  Conference  Board  Right  Associates/Right  Management
onsultants,  and  Lee  Hecht  Harrison,  among  others,  Parsons
2005a,b). These  private  studies  are/were  designed  to
nform  human-resource-sensitive  companies  about  sever-
nce  pay  practices  in  similarly  structured  ﬁrms,  not  to
rovide  policy  makers  with  a  description  of  the  labor  mar-ethodologies  and  less  universal  in  their  sample  frames,  and
he  raw  data  may  be  proprietary.
20 For excellent surveys of the U.S. displacement cost literature,
ee Jacobson et al. (1993), Fallick (1996), Kletzer (1998), and Farber
2011). For a sample of international studies, see Kuhn (2002).
21 For a discussion of trends in coverage, see Bishow and Parsons
2004).
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Despite  the  apparent  methodological  variations  in  the
private  studies,  a  consistent  picture  of  voluntary  severance
beneﬁt  generosity  emerges.  The  private  severance  system,
unlike  the  U.S.  public  unemployment  system,  targets  per-
manently  displaced  workers,  not  those  on  temporary  layoff,
and  the  basic  beneﬁt  algorithm  is  broadly  consistent  with
what  is  known  of  job  displacement  losses.  For  those  eli-
gible,  beneﬁts  are  offered  at  the  time  of  displacement  in
proportion  to  the  worker’s  weekly  wage  and  years  of  service.
To  take  one  example.Lee  Hecht  Harrison,  a  management
consulting  ﬁrm,  conducted  an  ambitious  survey  of  senior
HR  executives  at  U.S  organizations  about  their  severance
plans  in  2004,  and  received  925  completed  surveys,  Lee
Hecht  Harrison  (2005,  pp.  1--2).  Most  organizations  offered
some  form  of  severance  beneﬁts  and  of  those  that  did,  ben-
eﬁt  algorithms  differed  by  occupation.  Approximately  70%
offered  beneﬁt  schedules  to  professional  (managerial)  and
administrative  staff  that  were  strictly  based  on  years  of
service,  69%  and  73%  respectively.  Beneﬁt  algorithms  for
senior  executives  ad  executives  were  likely  to  be  less  rigid,
with  only  33%  and  41%  respectively  reporting  a  strict  years
of  service  formula.22
Among  those  whose  beneﬁts  were  determined  strictly  by
years  of  service,  one  week  of  pay  per  year  of  service  was
about  as  common  as  two  weeks  among  executives,  while
among  professionals  (managers  and  their  staff)  and  admin-
istrative  staff  it  was  distinctly  less  common,  Fig.  1,  Panel  A.
The  alternative  algorithms  when  beneﬁts  were  not  strictly
related  to  years  of  service  also  varied  sharply  across  the
two  groups.  Among  professionals  and  administrative  staff,
two-thirds  contained  years-of-service  as  one  part  of  a  mix
of  criteria.  Among  executives,  beneﬁts  determined  by  their
employment  contracts,  presumably  at  hire,  were  common,
Fig.  1,  Panel  B.
Neither  the  beneﬁt  structure  nor  the  generosity  of  these
voluntary  severance  plans  is  markedly  different  in  struc-
ture  or  generosity  from  plans  mandated  in  other  OECD
countries.  For  example  beneﬁts  increase  more  or  less  lin-
early  in  seniority.  Holzmann  et  al.  (2012)  have  compiled  a
detailed  compendium  of  country  mandates,  and  the  rela-
tionship  between  mandated  beneﬁts  at  four  years  and  those
at  twenty  are  illustrated  in  Fig.  2A  (for  OECD  countries  with
mandates  and  reported  beneﬁts  at  the  two  service  levels).
A  simple  regression  of  mandated  beneﬁts  at  20  years  of
service  on  beneﬁts  at  4  (illustrated  in  the  trend  line  of  the
ﬁgure)  reveals  an  intercept  of  1.715  with  a  standard  error
of  1.142  and  a  coefﬁcient  on  beneﬁts  at  4  years  of  3.237
with  a  standard  error  of  0.595  with  22  observations;  about
60%  of  the  variation  in  beneﬁts  at  20  years  of  service  can  be
explained  by  beneﬁt  mandates  at  4  years  R2 = 0.597.
The  common  beneﬁt  schedule  of  1-weeks  pay  per  year  of
service  is  also  similar  to  the  mandated  beneﬁts  in  many  other
OECD  countries,  Fig.  2B.  More  than  a  third  (8  of  22)  mandate
beneﬁts  that  average  less  than  one  week  per  year  of  service
over  twenty  years.  The  great  bulk  of  the  remainder  fall
22 For a standardized occupational mix, union workers are more
likely to be covered by a severance plan, but, among those with
plans, the median beneﬁt formula is also the familiar ‘‘a week of pay
per year of service’’ algorithm that characterizes beneﬁts outside
the collectively bargained work places, Pita (1996).
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anel  A:  year  of  service  in  beneﬁt  algorithms.
anel  B:  alternative  beneﬁt  factors.
ithin  the  one  to  two  weeks  of  pay  interval  common  in  vol-
ntary  plans  in  the  U.S.  Only  Israel,  South  Korea,  Portugal,
nd  Turkey  are  sharp  (positive)  outliers.
A variety  of  countries,  largely  developing  countries,  have
rom  time  to  time  mandated  beneﬁts  sharply  higher  than
hese.  Abidoye  et  al.  (2008,  p.  6)  for  example  report  that
n  2002,  ‘‘a  Sri  Lanken  worker  with  20  years  of  service
eceived  an  average  severance  package  equal  to  29  months
f  wages. .  .’’).  They  assessed  the  impact  of  this  extraor-
inary  mandate  on  employment  growth  by  ﬁrm  size  and
ector–ﬁrms  with  fewer  than  ﬁfteen  workers  were  legally
xempt  as  were  ﬁrms  in  export  processing  zonesdue  to
he  laxity  of  enforcement.  These  set  up  a  difference-in-
ifference  approach  to  employment  growth  rates  (measured
s  the  fraction  of  ﬁrms  that  expanded  employment).  They
ound  only  modest  and  sometimes  perverse  effects  of  these
mmodest  mandates.  One  might  conclude  that  the  regula-
ions  were  not  systematically  enforced.
.  Severance pay: designing a public strategyovernment  involvement  in  unemployment  insurance  plans
s  extensive,  with  governments  typically  both  designing
nd  operating  plans.  Government  involvement  in  severance
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Figure  2  Mandated  severance  beneﬁt  algorithms  by  country,
OECD.
Panel A:  beneﬁt  mandates  at  20  years  vs  mandates  at  4  years,
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The  nonperformance  problem  is  not  unique  to  severance
pay.  Concerns  about  nonperformance  of  pension  promises  in
the  United  States  led  to  passage  of  the  Employee  Retirement
23 Such compulsion may arise because of distortions induced by
other government programs and objectives. If the government is
committed to assuring a minimal level of consumption for the aged,ECD.
anel B:  average  weeks  of  pay  per  year  of  service  at  twenty
ears.
lans  has  been  much  more  limited,  mandating  that  ﬁrms
rovide  a  speciﬁed  level  of  coverage.  In  a  number  of  large
conomies,  notably  the  U.S.  and  Canada,  even  that  modest
ntervention  is  largely  absent.
The  exceptions  do  raise  the  natural  question  of  whether
overnments  should  be  involved  in  the  provision  of  sever-
nce  pay,  and  if  so  how.  Government  intervention  in  a sector
f  the  economy  is  often  rationalized  by  one  of  two  argu-
ents,
(i)  that  there  is  a  ‘‘missing  market,’’  perhaps  because  of
some  failure  of  property  rights  or  information  asymme-
try,  or
ii)  the  market  exists,  but  workers  are  not  competent  to
make  their  own  choices  on  the  issue.
If  the  former,  the  government  might  play  a  useful  role  in
upporting  the  market  by  encouraging  or  supplying  elements
f
r
s
hD.O.  Parsons
equired  to  have  the  market  function  appropriately.  If  the
atter,  the  government,  either  directly  or  through  incen-
ives,  must  override  worker  decisions  that  it  believes  are
ade  poorly.  The  latter  explains  for  instance  the  widespread
xistence  of  mandatory  retirement  income  plans,  essentially
orced  savings,  even  in  highly  developed  economies  which
ave  no  shortage  of  secure  savings  vehicles.23
The  missing  market  argument  seems  implausible  with
everance  pay,  which  is  a  relatively  simple  instrument,
equiring  only  the  payout  of  a  ﬁxed-sum,  often  in  lump-sum
orm,  at  the  time  of  (involuntary)  separation.  Presumably
everance  has  emerged  voluntarily  because  of  this  admin-
strative  simplicity.  Contrast  this  with  the  complexity  of
actual  loss)  unemployment  insurance  or  wage  insurance.
or  the  employing  ﬁrm  to  credibly  offer  either  of  these,  it
ust  monitor  the  behavior  of  workers  long  after  they  have
eparated  from  the  ﬁrm.  Is  the  laid  off  worker  in  fact  still
nemployed,  and,  if  reemployed  (elsewhere),  at  what  wages
nd  hours?  Even  governments  have  not  embraced  the  second
ask.
That  is  not  to  say  that  problems  do  not  arise  in  the  vol-
ntary  severance  ‘‘market.’’  A  major  concern  is  that  the
rm  may  not  pay  beneﬁts  as  promised  at  the  time  of  invol-
ntary  separation  or  may  not  be  able  to  do  so  because
f  bankruptcy,  Parsons  (2011). Bankruptcy  is  not  a  neg-
igible  prospect  when,  as  in  a  severance  pay  plan,  large
ayouts  often  occur  when  the  ﬁrm  is  under  serious  stress.If  a
rm  continues  to  operate,  need  it  make  good  on  severance
romises,  and  how  can  that  be  secured?  If  the  ﬁrm  goes
ankrupt,  bankruptcy  law  lays  out  how  remaining  resources
re  allocated  among  rival  claimants.
Markets  have  ways  of  dealing  with  the  nonperformance
ssue  beyond  simply  accepting  the  risk.  Firms  may  reinsure
ith  third  parties,  which  is  not  uncommon  for  fringe  beneﬁts
uch  as  life  or  health  insurance.  The  reinsurance  approach  is
imited  for  severance  insurance  because  the  ﬁrm  is  both  pur-
hasing  the  insurance  and  determining  whether  the  insured
vent  will  occur.  A  third-party  insurer  will  naturally  be  wary
f  adverse  selection,  much  as  it  would  if  offering  a  life  insur-
nce  policy  with  suicide  a  covered  event.
An  alternative  mechanism  is  to  provide  dedicated
eserves  against  losses.  This  is  an  expensive  proposition  in
he  absence  of  pooling  (reinsurance),  essentially  a  savings
lan  with  the  asset  reverting  to  the  ﬁrm  if  the  worker  leaves
he  ﬁrm  through  quit  or  retirement.  Growing  ﬁrms  especially
re  chronically  short  on  capital  and  having  accumulated
ssets  sitting  in  an  escrow  account  to  guarantee  payment
f  severance  is  not  likely  to  be  attractive  to  employers.  The
egal  status  of  such  escrow  accounts  in  bankruptcy  also  must
e  deﬁned.orced savings may be necessary to insure that workers do not
espond by saving nothing during their working lives. The compul-
ion in recent health care reforms in the United States appears to
ave this basis.
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Income  Security  Act  of  1974,  which  dealt  broadly  with  the
ﬁrm’s  performance  of  fringe  beneﬁt  promises.  Pensions,
much  the  largest  fringe  beneﬁt  in  ﬁnancial  magnitude,
received  special  status.  As  part  of  ERISA,  the  Pension  Bene-
ﬁt  Guarantee  Corporation  (PBGC)  was  established  to  insure
faithful  payments  of  retirement  beneﬁt  promises.  Not  only  is
the  PBGC  given  broad  oversight  of  pension  management  and
related  ﬁduciary  responsibilities,  it  operates  a  bankruptcy
protection  fund,  which  collects  premiums  and  pays  out
beneﬁts,  perhaps  only  partial  if  beneﬁts  are  especially  gen-
erous,  if  the  ﬁrm  becomes  insolvent.
The  combination  of  a  guarantee  fund  and  relatively  strict
regulatory  oversight  surely  increased  pension  performance
rates,  but  did  so  at  a  cost.  The  ﬁduciary  responsibilities  for
deﬁned  beneﬁt  plans,  which  promise  beneﬁts  based  on  earn-
ings  while  working,  are  especially  heavy,  and  administrative
costs  under  ERISA  correspondingly  high.  The  cost  burden  led
to  the  rapid  decline  of  deﬁned  beneﬁt  plans----plans  that
based  beneﬁts  on  some  combination  of  the  worker’s  his-
tory  of  earnings  with  the  ﬁrm,  Parsons  (1991)  and  Bloom  and
Freeman  (1992).  Retirement  savings  plans  (deﬁned  contribu-
tion  plans)  have  emerged  as  a  low  cost  alternative,  but  lack
many  attractive  features  of  deﬁned  beneﬁt  plans.24
It  is  natural  to  speculate  that  voluntary  severance
pay  coverage  would  also  shrink  if  ERISA  protections  were
extended  to  severance  pay  plans.  As  a  theoretical  issue,  this
conclusion  is  unclear.  With  secure  funding  and  guaranteed
beneﬁts,  the  worker  might  be  more  willing  to  forego  current
earnings  if  offered  a  severance  plan.  That  has  not  been  the
case  in  the  pension  market,  however.  The  history  of  pen-
sion  regulation  seems  to  make  clear  that  ﬁrms  will  offer
less  generous  programs,  and  perhaps  no  program  at  all,  if
administrative  costs  become  heavy.
A  solution  might  be  both  (i)  to  impose  the  regulatory
protections  embedded  in  ERISA’s  pension  provisions  on  the
plans,  and  (ii)  to  mandate  that  the  severance  plan  will
be  offered.25 That  will  not  eliminate  the  various  costs  of
supplying  severance,  of  course,  and  will  disproportionately
affect  ﬁrms  that  would  not  otherwise  supply  severance.  As
noted  earlier,  in  the  United  States,  voluntary  severance  pay
is  concentrated  among  higher  skilled  workers  employed  in
larger  ﬁrms  in  relatively  volatile  sectors  of  the  economy.
The  social  value  of  extending  severance  pay  mandates  and
regulatory  machinery  to  lower  paid  workers  in  smaller  ﬁrms
in  relatively  stable  sectors  is  unclear  without  more  detailed
analyses.  Is  less  wage  insurance  required  of  lower  paid  work-
ers  because  they  suffer  proportionately  lower  wage  losses?
Are  there  ﬁxed  costs  of  each  account  that  make  absolute
wage  losses  a  key  consideration?  Fixed  costs  of  accounts
would  also  argue  against  coverage  in  highly  stable  sectors
with  little  prospect  of  mass  layoffs----though  the  pain  of  lay-
off  may  be  the  same  for  those  unfortunate  few  who  are  laid
off  in  these  circumstances.  The  coincidence  of  high  admin-
istrative  costs  of  government  programs  and  small  ﬁrm  size  is
one  that  replays  itself  throughout  the  policy  environment;
24 Indeed the most common deﬁned contribution plan, the 401(k)
plan, had its tax deferred status clariﬁed only in 1978, shortly after
ERISA was passed.
25 The U.S. government did not choose to do so, perhaps because
it had in place a forced savings plan of its own, Social Security.
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arge  ﬁrms  are  ceteris  paribus  more  efﬁcient  in  highly  regu-
ated  environments.
.  Control of the workplace: an alternative
se of severance pay
everance  pay  is  one  of  several  instruments  essential  for  pro-
iding  job  displacement  insurance,  the  focus  of  this  essay.
everance  pay  also  has  an  alternative  use  of  a  more  con-
entious  sort,  including  the  shifting  of  workplace  control
rom  management  to  workers.  Confusion  over  the  two  uses
ay  explain  some  of  the  belief  that  severance  is  a  serious
mpediment  to  workplace  productivity.  The  ﬁrm’s  productiv-
ty  is  critically  dependent  on  efﬁcient  hiring  and  discharge
r  ﬁring  (involuntary  separation  for  cause)  practices.  Sever-
nce  pay  can  be  strategically  designed  to  discourage  release
f  individually  unproductive  workers.
Voluntary  severance  plans  usually  restrict  severance
ayouts  to  involuntary  separations  without  cause,  Parsons
2005a,b).  The  involuntary  restriction  makes  obvious  sense
s  insurance.  Voluntary  departures  are  under  the  worker’s
ontrol  and  typically  promise  better  outcomes.  Involuntary
eparations  ‘‘with  cause,’’  most  often  insubordination  or
ther  relatively  aggressive  actions,  do  have  large  negative
onsequences  for  future  wages,  but  again  are  likely  to  be
nder  the  individual  worker’s  control  and  therefore  unin-
urable.
Of  course,  when  ﬁrms  pay  out  nothing  to  those  ﬁred  for
ause  and  something  to  those  laid  off,  ﬁrms  have  an  incen-
ive  to  resolve  any  uncertainties  in  their  favor  and  declare
 separation  as  with  cause.  That  is  unlikely  to  be  a  prac-
ical  problem  in  large  ﬁrms  in  which  layoffs  are  likely  to
e  large  number  events,  and  disciplinary  separations  more
diosyncratic.  In  small  ﬁrms,  however,  in  which  both  types
f  separations  are  likely  to  be  small  in  number,  the  adjudi-
ation  issue  is  more  substantial.
Administrative  problems  aside,  a  severance  plan
esigned  to  shift  workplace  control  from  the  ﬁrm  to  work-
rs,  individually  or  collectively,  is  likely  to  have  a  payout
cheme  quite  distinct  from  the  usual  insurance  motivated
everance.  For  example  disciplinary  separations  occur
isproportionately  among  new  hires,  largely  young  workers,
nd  the  usual  severance  insurance  payout----in  voluntary
lans  or  mandated  plans  in  most  countries----offers  only
odest  beneﬁts  to  these  workers.  Severance  plans  designed
o  limit  disciplinary  separations  are  likely  to  require  large
ayments  to  younger  workers  upon  involuntary  separa-
ion.  Severance  for  control  is  also  likely  to  be  associated
ith  more  direct  measures,  including  the  possibility  of
einstatement  by  a  third-party.
0. Conclusion
nterest  in  potential  ﬁring  cost  distortions  was  piqued  by
arly  results  that  suggested  that  severance  pay  mandates
n  industrialized  economies  negatively  drive  key  elements
f  the  aggregate  labor  market,  including  employment  and
nemployment.  Subsequent  research  provided  reassurance
hat  severance  mandates  have  modest,  perhaps  trivial
ffects  on  these  aggregate  measures,  although  they  might
ffect  the  balance  between  young  and  old  in  the  competition
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or  jobs.  The  absence  of  effect  is  perhaps  not  surprising,
ecause  mandated  beneﬁts  are  in  general  not  especially
enerous  in  most  of  the  industrialized  world.  In  the  indus-
rializing  world,  some  mandated  severance  payouts  are  high
ut  these  may  be  sustainable  because  of  limited  enforce-
ent,  perhaps  targeting  large  foreign  ﬁrms  as  an  implicit
xtractive  resource  tax.
Voluntary  severance  plans  are  not  uncommon  in  the
nited  States,  which  does  not  have  mandated  severance.
his  suggests  that  mandates  might  be  ‘‘ineffective’’  in  many
ountries  with  beneﬁt  structures  similar  to  voluntary  plans
n  the  U.S.----that  is,  the  ﬁrms  might  provide  separation  ben-
ﬁts  in  the  absence  of  mandate.  Any  separation  instrument
hat  is  ﬁnanced  by  the  ﬁrm,  voluntary  or  mandated,  raises
ring  cost  concerns,  but  voluntary  provision  indicates  that
et  beneﬁts  are  positive,  and  ﬁring  costs  at  least  not  pro-
ibitive.  Indeed  there  are  methods  of  avoiding  ﬁring  costs
hile  maintaining  separation  payouts,  but  these  avoidance
echniques  are  not  used.  For  example,  were  ﬁring  costs  a
erious  problem,  they  could  be  avoided  by  substituting  a
everance  savings  plan  for  the  mandated  severance  insur-
nce  plan.  Voluntary  severance  savings  plans  are  virtually
nknown  in  the  United  States,  and  they  are  rarely  mandated
nternationally.  Of  course  the  administrative  costs  of  any
avings  plan  are  likely  to  be  large  relative  to  the  occasional
ayout  of  severance  insurance,  and,  if  workers  are  myopic,
he  expenditures  on  such  a  plan  may  not  be  offset  by  lower
ages.  Nonetheless  it  does  suggest  an  upper  bound  on  the
urden  of  severance  provision.
Unfortunately  the  early  focus  on  ﬁring  cost  distortions
iverted  attention  from  the  broader  question  of  the  poten-
ial  role  that  severance  pay  may  play  in  worker  income
ecurity.  Severance  pay  may  serve  both  as  scheduled  wage
nsurance  and  scheduled  supplemental  unemployment  insur-
nce.  In  the  latter  case,  severance  partially  substitutes  for
ctual-loss-based  unemployment  insurance,  which  may  dis-
ourage  active  job  search.  Severance  pay  should  then  be
ore  generous  (i)  if  reemployment  wage  losses  are  typi-
ally  large  and  (ii)  if  workers  are  sensitive  to  unemployment
nsurance  disincentives.
The  resulting  calculation  is  likely  to  vary  across  national
conomies  as  well  as  across  worker  skill  classes  and  indus-
rial  sectors,  although  the  simplicity  required  of  government
egulation  insures  that  mandated  severance  can  recognize
nly  a  few  such  distinctions.  Voluntary  severance  plans
aturally  capture  many  of  these  nuances;  in  the  U.S.  for
xample,  coverage  is  concentrated  in  larger  ﬁrms  and  higher
killed  workers  in  volatile  demand  sectors.  The  voluntary
attern  of  coverage  is  consistent  with  what  would  prevail
nder  the  assumption  that  beneﬁt  plans  have  ﬁxed  setup
osts  for  the  plan  as  a  whole  and  for  individual  accounts.
hether  economically  efﬁcient  coverage  is  socially  accept-
ble  is  a  deeper  policy  question.  Where  offered,  beneﬁts  are
oughly  as  generous  as  those  in  many  OECD  countries  that
andate  severance.
Voluntary  severance  plans  have  an  obvious
eakness----the  heaviest  payouts  come  in  periods  of
eak  demand,  when  the  ﬁrm  is  often  strapped  for  ﬁnancial
esources.  Perhaps  surprising,  nonperformance  of  severance
ay  in  the  U.S.  appears  limited  to  the  most  extreme  case,
hat  of  bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy  is  a  fundamental  problem,
ecause  control  of  the  ﬁrm’s  ﬁnances  shifts  to  the  courts
BD.O.  Parsons
nd  legislative  mandate.  It  is  of  course  possible,  if  relatively
xpensive,  to  set  up  a  regulatory  system  with  deposit  insur-
nce  to  guarantee  payment  of  severance.  It  is  currently
one  in  the  U.S.  for  private  pensions,  through  ERISA  (1974).
he  cost  of  these  regulatory  interventions  is  likely  to  be
ubstantial,  and,  judging  from  the  now  highly  regulated
rivate  pension  market,  would  induce  sharp  reductions
n  severance  coverage.  Mandating  severance  coverage
liminates  this  avoidance  possibility,  but  does  not  eliminate
he  underlying  cost,  which  is  likely  to  weigh  heaviest  on
rms  that  would  not  otherwise  provide  severance.
The  conclusion  that  severance  pay  rarely  induces  major
abor  market  distortion  must  be  tempered  by  the  concern
hat  severance  pay  is  not  always  designed  to  be  part  of
 job  displacement  insurance  package.  Severance  pay  can
or  example  be  used  to  shift  workplace  discipline  control
rom  the  ﬁrm  to  the  worker.  The  form  of  such  mechanisms
s  likely  to  be  quite  different  from  that  generated  by  sever-
nce  insurance  motives,  and  is  likely  to  be  accompanied  by  a
ariety  of  other  familiar  instruments,  including  the  threat  of
hird-party  reinstatement  of  the  worker  discharged.  These
dministrative  concerns  aside,  severance  pay  has  much  to
ecommend  it  as  a  part  of  a  job  displacement  insurance  plan.
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